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Abstract
The European Central Bank’s balance sheet policies have been criticized
as ineffective or even harmful to the economy. This paper aims at gauging
the effects on financial markets, the banking sector and lending to non-
financial firms. Using a structural vector autoregression analysis, we find
that balance sheet innovations help to decrease financial stress, stock market
risk and default rates initially. However, these beneficial effects on financial
markets are overturned in the medium run. Credit expands significantly and
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1 Introduction
Recent economic developments within the euro area macroeconomy have led the
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)
to develop new tools in order to fulfill their mandate and keep prices stable. Fol-
lowing the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial markets all
over the world experienced turbulent times, impairing bank lending and monetary
policy transmission. This financial shock also had significant effects on the finan-
cial system of the euro area. Due to increased uncertainty, the interbank market
broke down, which induced a liquidity shortfall for the euro area banking system.
Consequently, bank lending to non-financial firms declined, which had severe con-
sequences for the real economy. Output dropped sharply and inflation rates fell
far below the ECB’s definition of price stability. In a situation with a policy rate
approaching the zero lower bound, the ECB reacted with a basket of measures,
among which it implemented several asset purchase programs in order to provide
banks with liquidity and to improve bank lending. Subsequently, the euro area
sovereign debt crisis followed in the end of 2009 which again induced pressure on
financial markets and made new policy actions necessary.
Our study contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of the ECB’s policy
actions in terms of balance sheet expansions. We use a vector autoregression
(VAR) model to estimate the dynamic effects of asset purchase programs on the
macroeconomy. We propose a novel identification strategy which makes the model
well suited to consider possible side effects on financial markets. Compared to
existing empirical studies, our approach is more agnostic on the effects of measures
on financial markets because we refrain from restricting the respective responses
ex ante.
While the transmission channel of conventional interest rate policy is well un-
derstood and many - empirical as well as theoretical - studies exist on that topic,
the effects of the diverse set of unconventional measures, of which balance sheet
policy is one particular example, are still to be explored. In fact, it is not even clear
to which extent those measure are effective in bringing inflation and output back
to their target levels, let alone potential unintended side effects which may unfold
particularly within financial markets. Therefore especially macroprudential policy,
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which is supposed to address financial market imbalances and to maintain a well-
functioning financial system, should be interested in identifying and characterizing
risks to financial stability which may emerge from untested policy measures. Since
macroprudential policy in the euro area is also assigned to national institutions,
insights from a country-specific exercise are particularly useful.
There is a small but growing literature on the effects of euro balance sheet poli-
cies on the macroeconomy. Some studies approach the question with event studies
like Eser and Schwaab (2015), who show that the Securities Market Programme
(SMP) had a significant impact on sovereign yields. They consider common fac-
tors to control for aggregate developments. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2011) show that in the US, the quantitative easing programs QE1 and QE2 were
both effective in lowering nominal interest rates but the magnitude of the effect
differs across asset classes. Lambert and Ueda (2014) consider US banks and their
reaction to policy news. They do not find a positive effect on bank returns but
bank credit risk increases over the medium term. Szczerbowicz (2014) emphasizes
the effectiveness of different unconventional measures in the euro area. In particu-
lar, she shows that the interconnectedness between banks and sovereigns amplifies
the effect of policy announcements.
While those studies focus on specific purchase programs, they cannot estimate a
dynamic effect on the aggregate economy. In this respect, Casiraghi et al. (2013)
use a combination of two strategies. They investigate the effects of the SMP,
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and Longer Term Refinancing Opera-
tions (LTROs) within an event study. Subsequently, they feed their results into
a macroeconomic model of the Italian economy. They find that the SMP as well
as the OMTs were effective in decreasing government bond yields, while LTROs
improved lending conditions. Lenza et al. (2010) estimate a Bayesian VAR model
and compute counterfactual developments of key macro variables. They show that
monetary policy in exceptional times, represented by central bank liquidity man-
agement, is effective. Notably, their analysis refers to the fixed rate full allotment
policy of the ECB and therefore highlights demand-driven liquidity provisioning
of the banking system. Gambacorta et al. (2014) apply a mean group estimator
to their cross-country VAR model to show that balance sheet expansions have a
positive effect on output and prices. They consider information from 8 currency
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areas which helps them to overcome the problem of a relatively short sample.
Peersman (2011) compares conventional interest rate policy responses to uncon-
ventional balance sheet policy. He finds that both measures have a positive effect
on output and prices, while the transmission of a balance sheet expansion is more
sluggish. However, the analysis cannot distinguish exogenous policy shocks from
endogenous demand-driven effects originating in the banking sector. Similarly,
Darracq Parie`s and De Santis (2013) use information in the Bank Lending Survey
in order to compute dynamic effects of a credit supply shock. They show that the
ECB 3-year LTRO program from December 2011 is expansionary with respect to
output and inflation.
Our analysis is closely related to the one of Boeckx et al. (2014) who set up a
VAR model and consider the dynamic effects of the ECB’s asset purchase pro-
grams. Their analysis focuses on non-financial macroeconomic developments.
They show that an increase in the ECB balance sheet has a positive effect on
output, prices, and bank lending. In general they find favorable effects with re-
spect to balance sheet policy, with heterogeneity among euro area countries. To
identify a balance sheet shock, they impose a negative reaction of euro area fi-
nancial stress. Our approach uses an alternative identification strategy of the
balance sheet shock, which, we argue, is more agnostic with respect to financial
market variables. More specifically, we do not restrict financial market stress in
our shock identification scheme. We find favorable effects of balance sheet policies
with respect to financial stress and output within the first months. In the months
thereafter, the effect on output vanishes while financial stress even increases above
its pre-shock level. The identified effect on output and prices are subject to a
high degree of uncertainty where the price responses remain insignificant. Out-
put, inflation and financial stress respond much more strongly to a financial stress
shock than to an unconventional monetary policy shock in the form of direct asset
purchases.
We add to the literature a country-specific impact study, with a focus on the
German economy. Krishnamurthy and Nagel (2014) have shown that the ECB’s
SMP and OMT were successful in reducing government bond yields in periphery
countries. They also find beneficial spillover effects with respect to core countries,
while they do not determine the transmission channel. We show that balance sheet
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policy benefits the German banking and corporate sector by reducing liquidity
risk. Bank lending to non-financial firms is positively affected and market risk
aversion declines, such that overall output increases initially. Generally, effects on
output and prices are found to be economically small and exhibit a high degree of
uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our
dataset and gives a brief outline over the recent policy measures. Section 3 de-
scribes the econometric framework, as well as our identifying assumptions. The
estimation results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and ECB balance sheet
For the analysis, we consider a time series dataset at a monthly frequency which
ranges from January 2008 to December 2014. The short time period makes it
necessary to consider monthly observations in order to have sufficient information
available to estimate the VAR model. While there exist monthly data before
January 2008 it is important for our analysis to focus on the particular episode
where the ECB and the ESCB injected liquidity through asset purchase programs.
The following paragraph gives a short overview of the recent actions undertaken in
response to the financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis.
Figure 1 depicts the asset purchase programs of the ECB as parts of the balance
sheet item “securities held for monetary policy purposes” and Figure 2 contrasts
those securities with ECB’s main refinancing operations (MROs) and longer term
refinancing operations (LTROs).
During the sample period, the ECB decided to conduct several asset purchase
programs in order to stabilize bank lending, and to maintain a functioning mone-
tary transmission mechanism. Ultimately, inflation rates are targeted to approach
2% to conform with the ECB’s definition of price stability. We consider events
which we regard as ECB balance sheet policy within the time frame July 2008 to
March 2015.1
In July 2008 the Eurosystem central banks started to buy covered bonds, which,
1Szczerbowicz (2014) provides a detailed timeline of the ECB’s decisions, announcements
and the design of policy measures.
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Figure 1: ECB balance sheet items linked to asset purchase programs.
Source: ECB website
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/res/html/index.en.html).
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Figure 2: Main refinancing operations, longer term refinancing operations, and
securities held for monetary policy purposes as parts of the total ECB balance
sheet.
Source: ECB website
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/res/html/index.en.html) and
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
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as argued by the ECB, are an important source for banks’ refinancing. The total
aggregate value of the purchase program was 60 billion euros. Even though the
first Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP1) ended in June 2010, there
is still a significant amount of assets on the ECB balance sheet as can be seen
from Figure 1. In addition to this measure, the ECB announced a fixed rate full
allotment policy in October 2008. It allows banks to obtain as much liquidity
as needed, given adequate collateral and at a predetermined interest rate. The
full allotment policy directly aims at improving the liquidity position of banks
and it works through MROs and LTROs.2 In May 2010, the Eurosystem started
the SMP where it bought securities for 230 billion Euro. The second Covered
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2) was conducted between November 2011 and
October 2012. Bonds worth a total of 16 billion euros were purchased. In order to
clearly communicate the willingness to improve bank lending, the ECB conducted
forward guidance on future interest rates in July 2013. This included an official
publication of ECB forecasts according to which interest rates would remain at low
levels for an extended period of time. In November 2014, national central banks
started the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP). One month
later, the third Covered Bonds Purchase Programme (CBPP3) was introduced
and proposed to be conducted until June 2016. Finally, in March 2015 the Public
Sector Purchase Programme was launched, where the Eurosystem plans to buy
sovereign debt of a total value of 60 billion euros until September 2016.
With respect to the aforementioned measures, we separate two types of un-
conventional policy instruments. We label the first one, summarized by the ECB
balance sheet item “securities held for monetary policy purposes” as direct as-
set purchases. The second comprises the balance sheet items “Main Refinancing
Operations” and “Longer Term Refinancing Operations” and represents liquidity
management by the ECB. While the first instrument is used by the central bank
in a discretionary fashion, the second is adjusted to the liquidity demand of the
financial sector.3
2One may argue that during the time frame considered, MROs and LTROs can, to some
extent, be regarded as unconventional policy measures as well, especially because of the full
allotment policy. Our analysis distinguishes asset purchase programs from other unconventional
policy measures.
3A stylized representation of the ECB balance sheet can be found in Table B.1 in the ap-
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In general, the aim of the three CBPPs, the SMP and the ABSPP was to
encourage bank lending in order to repair the transmission channel of monetary
policy and ultimately to bring inflation back to a value of below (but close to) 2%.4
In this respect, President Mario Draghi stressed the ECBs willingness to consider
any measure that will preserve the euro as a stable currency. In his “whatever
it takes speech” at the Global Investment Conference in London in July 2012 he
explicitly committed the ECB with all conceivable measures to its price stability
mandate. However, government bond purchases were met with criticism within
the ECB’s Governing Council.
For the baseline specification of the VAR model we consider the MRO rate
to represent the conventional monetary policy instrument. The monthly data
frequency does not allow us to directly use GDP as a measure of output or eco-
nomic activity. We instead interpolate the quarterly series using the Chow and Lin
(1971) method5 and the monthly industrial production index. Euro area prices are
measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP); for Germany, we
use the consumer price index (CPI). The total of ECB assets/liabilities provides a
measure of the balance sheet size, while we consider the sum of the balance sheet
items related to the main refinancing operations and the longer term refinancing
operations separately from the rest. Differentiating balance sheet items helps us
to identify the ECB balance sheet shock as will be discussed in detail in section
3.2. In order to measure financial stress in the euro area we use the Composite In-
dicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) of Hollo´ et al. (2012) while for the German case
we have collected the comparable Bundesbank Stress Indicator for the German
Financial System. Most of the data is publicly available, where the main data
sources are the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW) and the Bundesbank.6
More detailed information on the data is provided in Table A.1 of the appendix.
pendix.
4See e.g. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.
5We want to keep our estimation results comparable to the literature and therefore follow
Boeckx et al. (2014) and Gambacorta et al. (2014) in this respect.
6Data on the Stress Indicator for the German Financial System, presented in Bundesbank
(2013), is not publicly available.
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3 VAR Model
We analyze the effects of monetary policy with a vector autoregression (VAR)
model, where we employ a novel set of identifying assumptions on the balance
sheet shock. The VAR allows us to model the effects of shocks dynamically, while
imposing a minimum set of assumptions about the structure of the economy. In
this respect, we build on the approaches of Peersman (2011), Gambacorta et al.
(2014), and Boeckx et al. (2014), who investigated the effects of balance sheet
shocks at an aggregate level.
3.1 Specification
Let us first consider the following reduced form VAR equation,
yt = c+
p∑
j=1
Bjyt−j + ut, with t = 1, . . . , T , (1)
where yt is an N × 1 vector of endogenous variables, ut ∼ N (0,Σ) is an N × 1
vector of reduced form residuals, c is an N×1 intercept vector, and Bj are N×N
matrices containing the VAR coefficients. In order to generate results comparable
to the literature, we opted for a lag length of p = 4.7 We propose the following
list of endogenous variables for the medium scale model:
yt =
[
rt yt pt bt st b
D
t
]
′
, (2)
where rt denotes the policy rate, yt denotes the logarithm of output, pt denotes the
logarithm of the price index, bt denotes the logarithm of total central bank assets,
st is an indicator of financial stress or another financial market variable, and b
D
t is
the logarithm of the sum of MRO and LTRO volumes.
Since the reduced-form VAR is not suited for structural analysis, we identify
7Throughout the analysis and across different specifications, we keep the specification com-
parable by using the same lag length. Robustness checks with different lag lengths showed similar
results and are available upon request.
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the following model,
A0yt = a+
p∑
j=1
Ajyt−j + et, with t = 1, . . . , T , (3)
where A0 is an N × N matrix such that Aj = A0Bj, a = A0c and et = A0ut
with et ∼ N (0, IN), IN is the N ×N identity matrix and E(utu
′
t) = (A
′
0
A0)
−1 =
Σ. Since the estimated model (1) does not allow us to identify the structural
form (3) without additional assumptions, we impose identifying restrictions on
the impulse response functions (IRFs) of shocks. The literature has developed
several methods to determine A0 based on economic considerations. We identify
the shocks using a combined sign and zero restrictions approach. We rely on
the method of Arias et al. (2014), who develop an algorithm which is robust to
erroneous credible intervals and unintended additional sign restrictions.8
3.2 Identification
The literature has considered different identifying assumptions on the unconven-
tional monetary policy shock. Given the ECB’s conversion to fixed rate full allot-
ment provisioning during the considered time frame, banks can in principle obtain
as much liquidity as they need at a given interest rate. Both exogenous balance
sheet policy decisions and higher liquidity demand by banks lead to an expansion
of the central bank balance sheet. Similarly, Szczerbowicz (2014) discriminates
between “asset purchases” and “other exceptional liquidity provisions”. Peersman
(2011) does not distinguish demand-driven expansions from asset purchase pro-
grams. He argues that even though a balance sheet expansion is demand-driven,
the policy decision to provide the banking sector with as much liquidity as needed
when financial stress occurs, is still taken by the ECB and as such represents a
policy decision. Boeckx et al. (2014) and Gambacorta et al. (2014) use variables
which indicate financial stress periods or periods with high risk aversion. They
require those measures to be non-increasing if an expansionary unconventional
8The authors show that other algorithms may lead to additional sign restrictions on vari-
ables which are seemingly unrestricted. Consequently, point estimates and confidence bands are
estimated with error.
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Variable Balance sheet Financial
shock shock
rt 0 (3 months)
yt 0 (1 month) 0 (1 month)
pt 0 (1 month) 0 (1 month)
bt ↑ (3 months) ↑ (1 month)
st ↑ (1 month)
bDt ↓ (3 months) ↑ (1 month)
Table 1: Identifying restrictions of shocks.
shock hits the economy. This assumption excludes demand-induced balance sheet
expansions which occur in stress periods.
In order to investigate the effects of an unconventional policy shock, it has
to be defined and identified unambiguously. In particular, the shock should be
orthogonal to other possible shocks in the model. We impose a mixture of sign
and zero restrictions on the impulse responses of certain variables in our VAR
model. Our identifying restrictions are summarized in Table 1.
For our analysis, unconventional monetary policy measures are represented by
ECB balance sheet adjustments.9 For this reason we necessarily require total cen-
tral bank assets (bt) to increase if a positive balance sheet shock hits the economy.
The literature on monetary policy transmission traditionally assumes that output
(yt) and prices (pt) are not contemporaneously affected by the policy measure.
In the same vein, it can be argued that an expansion of the central bank’s bal-
ance sheet should not change output and prices on impact. With this restriction
we exclude that other aggregate demand shocks, which increase both output and
prices, are interpreted as unconventional policy shocks. As discussed above, the
ECB’s fixed rate full allotment policy requires us to distinguish the balance sheet
shock from a demand-driven balance sheet expansion. Generally, an increase in
the balance sheet can be attributed either to the endogenous response to demand
9We abstract from other unconventional measures, such as loosening of collateral require-
ments, maturity transformations of refinancing operations or forward guidance.
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factors bDt or to an exogenous unconventional monetary policy shock ε
B
t , i.e.
10
bt = b
D
t + ε
B
t . (4)
Identifying the shock component εBt requires an additional restriction to disentan-
gle the endogenous from the exogenous component of the balance sheet. Since
demand-driven balance sheet expansions operate through either MROs or LTROs,
we require the sum of both (bDt ) not to increase. The restriction on the MRO
and LTRO volumes is a convenient way to identify the shock without restricting
the responses of financial stress. The policy rate (rt) does not react when an
unconventional shock hits the system.11
For comparison, we also identify a financial shock that increases stress on
financial markets (st). Differently from the balance sheet shock, banks are assumed
to increase the ECB’s balance sheet mainly through MROs or LTROs, while the
policy instrument remains unrestricted. Output and prices are sluggish and do not
react contemporaneously to the shock. One could view the dynamic responses to
this shock as picking up the ECB’s fixed rate full allotment policy at work. As we
impose banks to demand liquidity through MROs and LTROs in response to the
shock, the dynamics tell us something about the effectiveness of those measures.
In this spirit, Lenza et al. (2010), focus on effects of those demand-driven measures
which should not be confused with the balance sheet policy shock in column 2 of
Table 1.12
3.3 Estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods, where we use a flat prior dis-
tribution. In particular, we employ the specification in Uhlig (2005) and set the
respective prior matrices to zero which yields the posterior distribution with re-
spect to the reduced form model (1). Regarding the structural model (3), we
employ the algorithm in Arias et al. (2014) to draw the contemporaneous impact
10Here we abstract from other less relevant parts of the balance sheet.
11To discriminate between conventional and unconventional policy shocks, we also identified
a policy rate shock in a separate exercise. Results are available upon request.
12Peersman (2011) does not distinguish between these two types of measures and analyzes
the effectiveness of a mixture of both.
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matrix A0. As suggested by the authors, we obtain the reduced form estimates
B = [B1, . . . ,Bp] and Σ first, then a candidate random matrix A0 is proposed.
If the sign restrictions are satisfied, we keep the matrices {B,Σ,A0}. Otherwise,
we discard the triple. This procedure is repeated until we have generated a sample
of 15,000 draws from the posterior distribution, where the first 5,000 draws are
discarded in order to minimize the impact of the starting point.
4 Results
The analysis is performed in two steps. First, we consider impulse response func-
tions with respect to aggregate euro area data. Estimates for the euro area ag-
gregate are useful because they allow us to compare our results to the existing
literature. Beyond that, we discuss the validity of the identified balance sheet
shock and identify a financial stress shock. Thereafter, we estimate the model
on German data in order to assume a country-specific perspective. In particu-
lar, we focus on variables that contain information on firms’ and financial market
responses.
4.1 Euro area
Let us first consider our baseline specification, where the euro area composite stress
index (CISS) captures effects on financial markets. The CISS has been proposed
by Hollo´ et al. (2012), consists of five sub-indices and lies on the unit interval.
Since we employ a novel identification scheme, the baseline specification helps us
to assess the appropriateness of our identifying assumptions.
First, we assume that an expansionary exogenous balance sheet shock hits the
economy in period 0. According to column 2 in Table 1, the ECB balance sheet
increases for 3 months, while monetary policy is not allowed to use its conventional
interest rate instrument for three periods13, while at the same time the sum of the
13We choose more than one month because the ECBs purchase programs are generally quite
persistent. In Boeckx et al. (2014), restrictions are imposed on impact and the period following
the shock. In addition, we impose prolonged zero restrictions on rt for two reasons. First, we
do not want to mix up conventional policy shocks with balance sheet policy which leads us to
keep this restriction at least as long as the sign restriction on the balance sheet prevails. Second,
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Figure 3: Euro area. Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation
balance sheet shock.
balance sheet positions related to the ECB’s MROs and LTROs are assumed not to
increase. Inflation and output react only with a one-period lag to policy decisions.
The key innovation of our identification scheme is that we explicitly leave the
stress index unrestricted because we want to let the data speak on the response
of financial stress. The literature restricts financial stress to be non-decreasing
after policy interventions. We argue that, if our interest lies in financial market
reactions - as for instance represented by the CISS -, the respective responses may
be biased ex ante towards decreasing stress.
The results of this first exercise can be seen in Figure 3. Throughout the paper,
solid lines depict the median and the blue-shaded area represents the respective
16-86% quantiles of the posterior distribution.
Let us first comment on the appropriateness of our identifying assumptions.
Initially, our balance sheet shock drives down financial stress as measured by the
CISS without imposing this as a restriction. Results are therefore directly com-
parable with the balance sheet shocks identified in the literature14, while this
our results should contain some information about constrained conventional monetary policy
environments, i.e. under the zero lower bound restriction. We provide results with respect to an
alternative identification scheme in Figure A.1 in the appendix.
14Boeckx et al. (2014) impose that financial stress falls after an expansionary balance sheet
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approach gives us more flexibility in terms of analyzing effects on other variables.
At the same time, the shock has a temporary expansionary effect on the real econ-
omy such that output increases by about 0.1 percent in the period after the shock,
while in the following periods this effect cannot be distinguished from zero. Prices
increase slightly though not significantly. While the median of the policy rate in-
creases slightly, the response remains insignificant. The tendency to increase the
policy rate might be explained by a late reaction to the initial positive output re-
sponse. Beginning in the second month after the shock, stress increases and finally
overshoots its pre-shock level. This stress episode may be associated with higher
liquidity needs of banks such that they demand more central bank funding through
MROs and LTROs after approximately 7 months. Eventually, this reaction seems
to bring stress smoothly towards its pre-shock level again.
Note that results have to be considered with caution because the estimation
period is quite short and we cannot analyze the robustness of our results to sample
splits. Since the short sample size burdens the estimation with additional uncer-
tainty, we decided to identify policy shocks with restrictions imposed not only
in the impact period. A prolonged period of liquidity provision is more likely to
generate measurable effects while it is realistic to assume that the balance sheet
will increase not only for one period. Dynamic effects are less clear when restric-
tions are imposed on impact only, as can be seen in Figure A.1 in the appendix.
The robustness exercise does not call into question our main conclusion that bal-
ance sheet policy is hardly effective with respect to output and prices and may
potentially generate risks in the financial sector.
Comparing our impulse response functions to those in Boeckx et al. (2014), we
find qualitatively similar results, while the size of the reaction is smaller in our case
and responses of output and prices are insignificant in the medium run. One could
criticize that our approach may mix up heterogeneous effects of the asset purchase
programs undertaken by the ECB. However, as Szczerbowicz (2014) has shown,
the interconnectedness between banks and governments leads to similar effects for
different market participants and to an amplification of policy measures.
As our discussion about the identifying assumptions of the balance sheet shock
has shown, it is important to disentangle such a shock from unanticipated exoge-
shock.
15
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Figure 4: Euro area. Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock
to financial stress.
nous financial stress shocks. In order to show the differences in the transmission,
we identify a financial shock which endogenously induces banks to obtain liquidity
also from MRO or LTRO operations. According to column 3 in Table 1, a financial
shock is assumed to initially increase financial stress such that banks demand more
liquidity from the ECB through MROs and LTROs.
The dynamic responses to this shock are shown in Figure 4. Increased stress in
the economy raises uncertainty and thereby reduces aggregate demand by slightly
more than 0.1 percent, which leads to a drop in consumer prices. Policy reactions
to the shock are twofold. First, banks are assumed to demand more liquidity
from the central bank. Note that even though we imposed the restrictions on
impact only, the liquidity demand rises for at least three periods and financial
stress shows some persistence as well. Second, the ECB tries to counteract the
fall in demand and prices and possibly also the rise in financial stress by lowering
interest rates. The combination of decreasing interest rates and providing liquidity
through MROs and LTROs is quite effective in boosting aggregate demand and
also in lowering stress. While after about five months stress is back to its pre-shock
level, it takes output almost one year to recover. There is a negative short-run
effect on prices, though at medium and long horizons the confidence bands include
16
zero.
Inspecting the results carefully, at least one question arises with respect to the
effectiveness of policy interventions. If the central bank policy interest rate had
been constrained by the zero lower bound, would the negative effects on stress, and
aggregate demand have been stronger or longer lasting? We conducted another
exercise, where we assume that, similar to the balance sheet policy shock, interest
rates are tied to zero for at least three periods. The respective results are depicted
in Figure A.2 in the appendix. Qualitatively, responses are similar but, except for
financial stress, exacerbated. Interestingly, the response of stress is dampened if
the policy rate is restricted. This behavior supports the hypothesis that a mone-
tary policy that lowers interest rates in response to financial stress may promote
unsustainable lending and thereby may have undesirable effects on financial sta-
bility. Monetary policy actions potentially have adverse effects on financial stress.
When it comes to aggregate demand and especially price developments, the policy
rate seems to be the most important driver. As the interest rate does not drop
for the first three months, the recovery of aggregate demand is postponed and
consequently consumer prices do not increase, neither in the short- nor in the long
run. We conclude that the interest rate might be the right instrument to stabilize
output and prices while it may be harmful with respect to financial stability.15
4.2 Germany
The responsibility for financial stability is not exclusively assigned to euro area
institutions but lies also at the national level. Since one might argue that the
euro area is not a group of homogeneous countries, it is insightful to investigate
the effects of the asset purchase programs for specific cases. In fact, the German
position has long been skeptical about the programs undertaken by the ECB and
the ESCB. An evaluation of the recent measures is therefore particularly interesting
for the German case.
15We compared our identified unconventional policy shock to a conventional expansionary
interest rate shock. Results are consistent with the findings of Abbassi and Linzert (2012), who
observe a loss in conventional policy effectiveness. In fact, the impact of conventional policies on
financial stress remains uncertain in our sample. Results in terms of impulse response functions
are available upon request.
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Figure 5: Germany. Impulse response functions of financial market variables to a
balance sheet shock.
We conduct similar experiments as for the euro area case. First, we estimate
impulse response functions for the baseline specification. Then we replace the
financial stress index by other variables of interest. We consider the same time
horizon, lag length, and identification scheme as for the euro area. Compared to
the euro area exercise, responses show a very similar pattern and are therefore
omitted and available upon request.
In order to get a more detailed picture on how the asset purchase programs
affect the economy especially in the corporate and financial sectors, we consider
alternative specifications to our baseline choice of variables (2). In particular,
we successively replace the financial stress index st with a series from a set of
variables that contain information on the policy transmission channel. Figures 5
and 6 contain the responses of those variables with respect to a monetary policy
balance sheet shock.16
The German financial stress index consists of 7 sub-indices which might contain
additional specific information on how the shock affects financial markets. Let us
consider the “market liquidity stress index” and the “credit risk” indicator. While
the indices are strongly correlated, the impulse response functions do exhibit some
differences. Both indices drop on impact, but cross the zero line again within
the first months after the shock, indicating a significant but short-lived effect of
policy interventions. However, we find that the purchase programs reduce market
liquidity stress more than credit risk.17 Similar to the composite stress index, we
16Due to space constraints we omit plots with respect to the other 5 variables included in the
VAR.
17Robustness checks with respect to the EONIA-MRO rate spread show that credit risk is
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observe that after a few months, indicators may even become positive, pointing
to undesirable second round effects of the shock. One reason for the unfavorable
effects on credit risk might be that banks grant riskier loans in response to the
shock, which has adverse effects on credit risk. Eser and Schwaab (2015) find
a strong but temporary reduction of liquidity risk premia due to the SMP in
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, while bid-ask spreads widened again
afterwards. A part of credit risk is also represented by implicit default rates of
German non-financial firms. This indicator also drops sharply on impact and
reverts back gradually. Lambert and Ueda (2014) find for US data that credit risk
increases over the medium term in response to unconventional policy news. Our
dynamic analysis allows us to consider effects that do not necessarily emerge on
impact but may unfold in subsequent months.
Asset purchases may in principle generate unsustainable lending to non-financial
firms. As a consequence, default rates of those firms could rise in response to the
shock. We observe that non-financial firms are initially less likely to default. This
may be explained by the positive effect on output and aggregate demand which
improves firms’ conditions. In the medium term, the median response becomes
positive. While this effect may be attributed to unsustainable lending, the re-
sponses are hardly significant which makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions.
The VDAX-NEW index reflects risk aversion in the stock market. Results show
that market participants immediately become more optimistic about future stock
market developments. However, this short boost to optimism is overturned later
which may be attributed to the above arguments of unsustainable lending.
We proxy credit risk by loan write-offs as a fraction of German banks new
lending. Angbazo (1997) or Dick (2006) have considered measures based on loan
write-offs to proxy credit default risk. One concern related to liquidity injections
is that banks might roll over existing loans or extend new loans to nonviable
firms which would be reflected in an increased number of net loan write-offs.18
The median response shows that, at least in the short run, liquidity provisioning
induces banks to reduce their loan write-offs. While this result is associated with
not effectively eliminated by the policy measures.
18Lambert and Ueda (2014) find US banks to avoid repairing their balance sheet and call this
“evergreening”.
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Figure 6: Germany. Impulse response functions of financial market variables to a
balance sheet shock.
estimation uncertainty, it may point to the avoidance of balance sheet repair.
The ECB usually argues that its unconventional measures help to restore the
monetary transmission channel. They involve supporting banks’ credit provision
to non-financial firms in order to finance new investment projects. The impulse
response of bank lending indicates a significant and persistent expansion of credit.
Indicators thus suggest that the ECB was successful in restoring bank lending to
non-financial firms, painting a rather optimistic picture of sustained credit growth.
Considering the reactions of the equity ratio suggests that the banks do not use
the liquidity provided by the central bank in order to recapitalize their balance
sheets by obtaining more equity financing. The equity ratio falls initially since
banks expand their balance sheets but do not adjust their equity enough to keep
the ratio constant. In the medium run balance sheets still seem exhibit a lower
equity ratio, while after about 15 months, it reverts back, which may reflect target
equity ratios of banks to be reached again.
The portfolio balancing channel has often been mentioned in connection with
central bank asset purchase programs.19 Among other things, it predicts a decline
in interest rates. If the central bank undertakes large-scale asset purchases, the
19See e.g. Draghi (2014).
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prices of those assets should rise and interest rates on these assets should decline
accordingly. Since interest rates on assets fell and investors are equipped with
liquidity from the central bank, they have an incentive to rebalance their portfolios
and to buy comparable but more profitable assets. The increased demand will in
turn induce asset prices to increase and interest rates to fall. We introduce bank
lending rates in the VAR in order to test the pass-through to lending rates to
non-financial corporations. Results show that lending rates do not decrease on
impact. It takes more than eight months for the median response to fall below its
pre-shock level. Consequently, we observe only a lagged and insignificant portfolio
balance effect on bank lending rates. Looking at this result more closely, we note
that interest rate are tightly connected to the policy rate. Since we require the
policy rate not to change for at least three months, lending rates, too, are unlikely
to fall.20
We find that most variables’ reactions are quite short-lived and show a clear
reaction only for less than five months, while credit supply is positively affected by
the shock for about ten months. The reaction of bank lending rates seems to be
heavily influenced by the policy rate which prevents them from falling in response
to an exogenous balance sheet expansion.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effects of ECB’s balance sheet policies, focussing on
financial market variables. We disentangle unconventional monetary policy shocks
and endogenous monetary policy reactions through changes in the balance sheet.
We find that ECB balance sheet policies, in the form of direct asset purchases, bring
down financial stress, stock market uncertainty and defaults in the euro area only
initially. The positive effects are reversed within a horizon of around 2 years. At
the same time, unconventional policy shocks improve corporate lending and have
an expansionary (but mild) effect on economic activity, while the effect on prices
20We considered a robustness exercise, where we require the policy rate to stay unchanged
only on impact instead of three months. As a consequence, the policy rate is lowered in response
of the shock, which allows bank lending rates to decline. Considering instead the spread between
bank lending rates and the policy rate yields much uncertainty around a zero response of the
spread. The respective impulse response functions are not shown but are available upon request.
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remains insignificant. Our approach differs from the existing literature in that we
do not impose restrictions on financial stress in order to identify an expansionary
balance sheet shock. Initially, a shock to financial stress has a contractionary effect
on the economy, while subsequent liquidity provision and a reduced policy rate help
to lower stress and to restore economic activity. In sum, liquidity provision through
direct asset purchase programs seem to have the desired effect on financial stress
and also on output within the first months. Given that the financial market effects
of direct asset purchase programs are quickly overturned, output effects are small
and temporary, and financial stress shocks have potentially large adverse effects,
this may suggest that direct asset purchases are a less effective instrument than
are endogenous balance sheet policy measures such as the fixed rate full allotment
scheme.
Implications of the asset purchase programs for the German economy are gen-
erally favorable but short-lived. Financial stress declines mainly through a reduc-
tion in liquidity risk. Also stock market volatility and risk aversion decrease in
response to the policy measure. The ECB is successful in restoring credit creation.
Bank lending rates, however, do not decrease as suggested by the portfolio balanc-
ing channel. The risk of unsustainable lending seems to be rather small; neither
default rates nor the loan write-offs ratio rise significantly, indicating that bank
lending does not appear to become distinctly more risky. Consequently, our anal-
ysis shows that risks to financial stability are limited while the effects on output
are relatively small and estimated with uncertainty. We do not find a considerable
effect on prices.
The question remains to which extent unconventional measures influence single
financial institutions and how effects feed back to the macroeconomy. It would
be particularly interesting to consider data at an institutional level in order to
overcome the small sample size problem. Considering more disaggregated data
within more sophisticated models is left for future research.
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Appendix
A Data
Table A.1 gives a detailed overview of the data series used in our analysis. Some
of the series were transformed before estimation. Data on real GDP is not avail-
able on a monthly frequency. For this reason we imputed the missing values
using the Chow and Lin (1971) method as it is done in Boeckx et al. (2014) and
Gambacorta et al. (2014). In general, we used seasonally and working day ad-
justed data where applicable. In the case of German loan write-offs, adjusted
series were not available and we constructed seasonally adjusted data by applying
the X-13ARIMA method. We found that seasonal adjustment does not signif-
icantly influence the results. The data on loan write-offs and the equity ratio
are taken from the monthly balance sheet statements (Monatliche Bilanzstatistik)
which consists of confidential data on German banks’ balance sheets. The former
are net write-offs, depreciation less revaluation of credit to the non-banks sector
as an aggregate over the German banking sector, while the latter is aggregate eq-
uity divided by total assets of German banks. Bank lending comprises lending to
non-monetary financial institutions (MFIs) excluding the government sector. The
variable measures annual growth rates is adjusted for sales and securitization.
B Additional tables and figures
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Figure A.1: Euro area. Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation
balance sheet shock with alternative identifying assumptions.
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Figure A.2: Euro area. Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation
shock to financial stress with additional constraint on the policy rate.
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Series Source Identifier
Euro area
ECB total assets ECB SDW ILM.W.U2.C.T000.Z5.Z01
Real GDP Eurostat namq 10 gdp
Industrial production ECB SDW STS.M.I8.Y.PROD.NS0010.4.000
HICP ECB SDW ICP.M.U2.S.000000.3.INX
CISS ECB SDW CISS.D.U2.Z0Z.4F.EC.SS CI.IDX
MRO rate ECB SDW FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.MRR FR.LEV
EONIA rate ECB SDW FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.MM.EONIA.HSTA
MRO volumes ECB SDW ILM.W.U2.C.A051.U2.EUR
LTRO volumes ECB SDW ILM.W.U2.C.A052.U2.EUR
Base money ECB SDW ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR
Germany
CPI Bundesbank BBDP1.M.DE.Y.VPI.C.A00000.I10.A
Real GDP Eurostat namq 10 gdp
Industrial production Bundesbank BBDE1.M.DE.Y.BAA1.A2P300000.G.C.I10.A
Composite stress index Bundesbank Internal data
Market liquidity index Bundesbank Internal data
Credit risk index Bundesbank Internal data
Implicit default rates Bundesbank Internal data
VDAX-NEW Datastream VDAXNEW
Write-offs Bundesbank Internal data
Equity ratio Bundesbank Internal data
Lending ECB SDW BSI.M.DE.N.A.A26.A.I.U2.2200.Z01.A
Lending rates ECB SDW MIR.M.DE.B.A2I.AM.R.A.2240.EUR.N
Table A.1: Data and corresponding sources.
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Assets Liabilities
Gold and gold receivables Banknotes in circulation
Claims on non-euro area residents in foreign currency Liabilities to euro area credit institutions in euro
Claims on euro area residents in foreign currency Current accounts
Claims on non-euro area residents in euro Deposit facility
Lending to euro area credit institutions in euro Fixed-term deposits
Main refinancing operations Fine-tuning reserve operations
Longer-term refinancing operations Deposits related to marginal calls
Fine-tuning reverse operations Other liabilities to euro area credit institutions in euro
Structural reverse operations Debt certificates issued
Marginal lending facility Liabilities to other euro area residents in euro
Credits related to margin calls Liabilities to non-euro area residents in euro
Other claims on euro area credit institutions in euro Liabilities to euro area residents in foreign currency
Securities of euro area residents in euro Liabilities to non-euro area residents in foreign currency
Securities held for monetary policy purposes Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF
Other securities Other liabilities
General government debt in euro Revaluation accounts
Other assets Capital and reserves
Total assets Total liabilities
Table B.1: Stylized ECB balance sheet. Source: ECB Statistics Bulletin.
28
Copyright © 2015 @ the author(s). Discussion papers are in draft form. This discussion paper 
is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without 
permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. 
 
 
